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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Did the trial court commit reversible error by failing to remove three 
prospective jurors for cause, when an impartial jury was empaneled and no prejudice 
resulted? 
Standard of review: A trial court's determination of whether to excuse a 
prospective juror for cause should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion and a 
showing of actual prejudice. State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, 24 P.3d 948. 
II. Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the jury's verdict? 
Standard of review: Reversal of a jury verdict for insufficiency of the evidence is 
proper "only when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a 
light most favorable to the verdict, [the appellate court finds] that the evidence to support 
the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the 
verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v. Silva? 2000 UT App 292, 13 P.3d 604. 
A party seeking reversal of a jury verdict on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence 
must "marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. 
Boyd, 2001 UT 30,112, 25 P.3d 985. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES OR STATUTES 
Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Addendum A. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/appellant Geraldine K. Harding ("Harding") filed this medical malpractice 
action on or about December 10, 1997, alleging defendant/appellee Carl T. Bell 
("Dr. Bell"), a physician specializing in family medicine, failed to diagnose and treat her 
coronary artery disease ("CAD") and timely refer her to a cardiologist. Harding claims 
that earlier diagnosis of her CAD would have prevented a heart attack she suffered on 
January 26, 1997. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
A six-day jury trial was held on March 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, and 15, 2000, before the 
Honorable Fred A. Howard. The jury returned a special verdict determining that Harding 
was 55 percent negligent and Dr. Bell was 45 percent negligent. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
When reviewing a jury verdict, this court must "examine the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict.35 State v. 
Krager, 2000 UT 60, 1112, 6 P.3d 1116. Dr. Bell recites the facts accordingly.1 
1. On or about January 4, 1997, Harding, who was then 49-years old, 
experienced severe chest pain, left arm numbness, sudden nausea, dizziness, profuse 
sweating and severe sternal pressure, while at a truck stop with her husband in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. (R. at 1414 pp. 71-76.) 
1
 Dr. Bell objects to Harding's Statement of Facts for failure to recite the facts "in 
a light most favorable" to the jury verdict, as is Harding's burden. Instead, Harding re-
argues her theory of the case. "This approach is inappropriate." Beesley v. Harris. 883 
P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994). 
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2. Harding's symptoms abated after about 30 minutes, except her left shoulder 
and arm stayed numb for about an hour. (R. at 1414 p. 76.) 
3. Harding described the chest pain and symptoms she experienced on 
January 4, 1997, at the truck stop to her mother and best friend, who were concerned and 
prompted Harding to seek medical care. (R. at 1414 pp. 77-78.) 
4. On or about January 6, 1997, Harding called Dr. Carl T. Bell's office and 
scheduled an appointment for January 13, 1997. (R. at 1414 pp. 78-79.) 
5. At the January 13, 1997, office visit, Harding informed Dr. Bell of her 
January 4, 1997, chest pain and symptoms, and stated that she had been without chest 
pain or other symptoms since that time. (R. at 1414 p. 83; R. at 1422 Def.'s Ex. A p. 7.) 
6. During this January 13, 1997, exam, Dr. Bell performed an in-office EKG, 
which was interpreted as normal by Dr. Bell. The EKG was "over-read53 by Dr. Von 
Welch, a board-certified internist, who confirmed that the EKG was normal. (R. at 1414 
pp. 84-86; R. at 1413 p. 43; R. at 1422 Def.'s Ex. A p. 14.) 
7. Also on January 13, 1997, Dr. Bell had blood drawn and a CPK test 
performed to determine whether cardiac enzymes indicative of heart muscle damage were 
present. Laboratory tests confirmed that Harding's CPK level was normal. (R. at 1413 
p. 43; R. at 1422 Def.'s Ex. A. pp. 9-10.) 
8. During the January 13th office visit, Dr. Bell also ordered an exercise 
treadmill test ("ETT"), to be performed at American Fork Hospital, and Dr. Bell's office 
scheduled Harding's ETT for January 22, 1997. (R. at 1414 pp. 86-87.) 
9. The ETT was performed on January 22, 1997, at American Fork Hospital 
by an ETT technician, with Dr. Bell present. (R. at 1414 pp. 90-93.) 
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10. The ETT was initially over-read within 24-hours of administration by an 
internal medicine physician at American Fork Hospital, Dr. Marian Hansen, who 
interpreted it as "suggesting ischemia." Dr. Hansen did not recommend that any 
follow-up testing be done or medical care provided on an urgent basis. (R. at 1422 Def.'s 
Ex. A p. 67.) 
11. Dr. Bell accordingly referred Harding to Dr. Ronald Asay, a cardiologist 
practicing in Provo, Utah, and scheduled an appointment for Harding with Dr. Asay on 
February 5, 1997. (R. at 1414 pp. 96-98.) 
12. On January 24 and 25, 1997, Harding had recurrent chest pain, along with 
malaise, tiredness and exertional discomfort. (R. at 1415 pp. 67-68, 81; R. at 1422 Def.'s 
Ex. A. p. 114.) 
13. Despite the fact that Harding knew of potential heart problems and had an 
appointment to be examined by a cardiologist, she sought no medical treatment for these 
symptoms. She did not go to an emergency room, call Dr. Bell or seek any other medical 
care on either of those two days. (R. at 1414 pp. 66-68, 75-78, 121; R. at 1415 pp. 67-
68; R. at 1422 Def.'s Ex. A. p. 114.) 
14. Dr. Kim Bateman, a board-certified family practice physician, testified at 
trial that if Harding had sought medical attention on January 24th or 25th for her chest 
pain and symptoms, she would have been admitted to the hospital where an angioplasty 
would ultimately have been performed, her CAD discovered and imminent heart attack 
prevented. (R. at 1416 pp. 26-27, 64.) Dr. Bateman also testified that Dr. Bell's 
treatment met the medical standard of care. 
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15. On January 26, 1997, Harding experienced severe chest pain while cleaning 
horse stalls. She was taken to the American Fork Emergency Department by her husband, 
and shortly thereafter was transferred via ambulance to Utah Valley Regional Medical 
Center. (R. at 1414 p. 100-102; R. at 1422 Def.5s Ex. A p. 17-19, 34-35.) 
16. An angiogram performed the following morning, January 27, 1997, 
disclosed Harding's CAD. That same day a coronary angioplasty was successfully 
performed by Dr. Douglas R. Smith. (R. at 1415 p. 64; R. at 1422 Def.'s Ex. A pp. 20-
23, 34-35.) 
17. Harding was discharged from Utah Valley Regional Medical Center three 
days later and has returned to full normal activity. (R. at 1414 pp. 108; R. at 1422 Def.'s 
Ex. A p. 54, 56, 61; R. at 1415 pp. 72-73.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court's refusal to grant Harding's requested "for-cause" challenges 
provides no basis for reversal of the jury verdict. The trial court appropriately exercised its 
discretion in determining that the potential jurors were qualified. Harding used her 
peremptory challenges to strike these same three jurors, and she cannot demonstrate that 
the jurors who heard the case were biased. Thus, even if the three potential jurors should 
have been dismissed for cause, plaintiff cannot demonstrate actual prejudice as required for 
reversal. 
II. Harding has made no attempt to marshal the evidence supporting the trial 
court's decision, and for this reason alone this court need not consider Harding's challenge 
to the sufficiency of the findings. Additionally, there is more than sufficient evidence to 
support the jury verdict allocating 45 percent of fault to Dr. Bell and 55 percent of fault to 
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Harding. This verdict is well within the range of possible outcomes supported by the 
evidence presented, especially when viewed in the light most favorable to Dr. Bell. This 
court must accordingly defer to the jury's assessment of liability and affirm. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURTS REFUSAL TO GRANT HARDING'S 
REQUESTED FOR-CAUSE CHALLENGES PROVIDES NO 
BASIS FOR REVERSAL. 
A trial court's determination of whether to excuse a prospective juror for cause 
should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, 1125, 
24 P. 3d 948. Utah appellate courts are constrained to review such decisions with 
deference because of the trial judge's "advantaged position in determining which persons 
would be fair and impartial jurors." Id. at 1125. 
Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures provides that challenges for cause 
are appropriate when it is demonstrated: 
(6) That a state of mind exists on the part of the 
juror with reference to the cause, or to either 
party, which will prevent: him from acting 
impartially and without prejudice to the 
substantial rights of the party challenging; but 
no person shall be disqualified as a juror by 
reason of having formed or expressed an opinion 
upon the matter or cause to be submitted to 
such jury founded upon public rumor, 
statement in public journals or common 
notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court 
that the juror can and will, notwithstanding such 
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the 
matter to be submitted to him. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 47(f) (emphasis added). 
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When a juror makes comments on voir dire that facially raises a question of the 
juror's partiality or prejudice, an abuse of discretion occurs "unless the challenged juror is 
removed by the court or unless the court or counsel investigates and finds the inference 
rebutted." Wach? 2001 UT 35, K25 (emphasis added). To rebut an inference of partiality, 
the trial court "must adequately probe [the] juror's potential bias," and receive, through its 
questioning, sufficient evidence that the juror will act impartially. State v. Boyatt, 854 
P.2d 550, 551 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). Rebuttal is 
accomplished by showing that a juror would not "close the mind against the testimony 
that may be offered in opposition.35 Wach, 2001 UT 35,1127. If, after investigation into 
the juror's state of mind, the trial court is satisfied that the juror can act impartially, the 
trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to remove the prospective juror for 
cause. See Id. at 1129. 
A. HARDING CAN DEMONSTRATE NO ACTUAL BIAS. 
Harding seeks reversal of the jury verdict in this case on the basis that the trial 
court erred in denying her challenges for cause to potential Jurors Nos. 7, 11 & 12. A 
careful review of voir dire and the follow-up investigation demonstrates no actual bias and 
further that there was sufficient evidence that each juror would act impartially. 
Potential Juror No. 7 
Harding contends the following facts elicited from potential Juror No. 7 during 
voir dire demonstrate bias: Potential Juror No. 7 lived in American Fork, took her 
daughter to dance lessons at Dr. Bell's home taught by Dr. Bell's daughter, and knew 
Dr. Bell's wife and children through the local elementary school. (Aplt. Br. p. 7.) 
Harding fails to point out that potential Juror No. 7 also stated to the court that she did 
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not know Dr. Bell, (R. at 1423), and that her acquaintance with Dr. Bell's daughter and 
wife were "brief.33 (R. at 1411, pp. 4-15; R. at 1423.) These facts do not demonstrate 
potential Juror No. 7 was partial. They are instead exactly the type of contact jurors in 
small Utah towns commonly have with parties at trial. 
Nevertheless, even if voir dire had indicated bias, the trial court properly passed 
potential Juror No. 7 for cause because, after further questioning, it was assured of her 
impartiality. Harding takes issue with potential Juror No. 7 because she stated on voir 
dire: 
Q: [The Court] Have you developed a social or friendship relationship 
with [Dr. Bell's family]? 
A: [Potential Juror No. 7] No, just know who they are. 
Q: In the event you were selected to serve as a juror, would that cause you to 
feel uncomfortable in any way in rendering some decisions? 
A: I don't believe so. I don't think I could guarantee that. 
(R. at 1411 pp. 4-5.) 
Harding fails to mention, however, that potential Juror No. 7 was questioned in 
chambers after this statement was made and the following investigation occurred: 
Q: [Mr. Ferguson] Not knowing how the case is going to turn 
out or how you would feel about it, whether you vote for the 
Plaintiff or the Defendant, would your relationship with Dr. 
Bell's family inhibit you in any way from making what you 
believe to be a fair determination of the case? 
A: [Potential Juror No. 7] No, I don't believe it would inhibit 
me. 
(R. at 1411 pp. 8-9.) 
The trial court further probed into potential Juror No. 7's potential biases regarding 
lawyers and physicians: 
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Q: [The Court] But you do not have such sympathies [for 
physicians]. 
A: [Potential Juror No. 7] I don't believe I do. 
Q: You don't have a sympathy for either [the doctor or lawyers] 
then? 
A: I don't think I do. 
Q: Do you have a sympathy for physicians. 
A: I don't believe I do. I think I could be just as loyal to either one. 
(R. at 1411 p. 12.) 
Given this testimony, it was well within the trial judge's discretion to determine 
potential Juror No. 7 could serve impartially and without prejudice and to decline to 
disqualify her for cause as a juror. 
Potential Juror No. 11 
Potential Juror No. ll 's connection with Dr. Bell likewise raises no concerns of bias 
or impartiality. Harding challenges potential Juror No. 11 because she was a second 
cousin to one of Dr. Bell's expert witnesses, Dr. Kim Bateman, and who stated she was 
close to Dr. Bateman's mother. (Aplt. Br. pp. 5-6; R. at 1411 pp. 16-17.) These facts do 
not demonstrate that potential Juror No. 11 would be prevented from acting impartially 
or without prejudice.2 
2
 Apparently Harding assumes that these facts would make potential Juror No. 11 
biased in favor of Dr. Bateman. Common experience, however, allows us to assume that 
many family members exercise heightened caution to be neutral and objective when 
evaluating testimony of a relative. And, if potential Juror No. ll 's familial relationship 
were indicative of bias, it is just as likely to operate against Dr. Batemen, as it is in favor of 
Dr. Bateman. The real issue is not the relationship per se, but the prospective juror's 
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Even if these facts were indicative of possible bias, potential Juror No. 11 
repeatedly assured the trial court that she would be impartial: 
Q: [The Court] If he were called to testify would that pose a 
problem for you? If you were to serve as a juror would you 
tend to favor his testimony by virtue of your relationship? 
A: [Potential Juror No. 11] I don't think so. 
Q: Do you think you could be impartial? 
A: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q: . . . If you were to tend to discredit his testimony and yet you 
had to see him in the future because of your relationship, do 
you think that would make you uncomfortable? 
A: No. 
Q: Do you think, irrespective of your family relationship of being a cousin, that 
you could treat his testimony fairly and impartially. 
A: I think so, because I really don't see him; it's his mother. 
(R. at 1411 pp.18-19.) 
Further, 
Q: [The Court] . . . If you were to serve as a juror do you think you could 
serve in this capacity fairly and impartially, knowing that you're a cousin, 
you have a relationship? Or do you think it would simply cause you to 
favor him if some other doctor came in taking a different opinion on the 
subject that Dr. Bateman was testifying on? You see? Would that tend to 
color the way in which you viewed their testimony by virtue of their 
relationship? 
A: [Potential Juror No. 11] I don't think so by virtue of my relationship, 
because I'm just not that close to Kim. I don't know him as a person; I just 
know him as a name on a family list. 
attitude. 
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(R. at 1411 pp. 22-23.) Following this colloquy, Harding's counsel challenged potential 
Juror No. 11 for cause and the trial court declined, stating cTm pursuaded she's qualified 
and Fll pass her." (R. at 1411 p. 28.) Given that potential Juror No. 11 repeatedly told 
the court in chambers that she did not know the witness except as a "name on a family 
list," and that she would be fair, objective and would not be biased in favor of 
Dr. Bateman's testimony, it was well within the trial court's discretion to decline to excuse 
her for cause. 
Rather than demonstrate the requisite "actual bias" or abuse of discretion, Harding 
contends that the plurality opinion in State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951, is 
cchauntingly similar" to the present case and requires this court to find the trial court 
abused its discretion in passing Jurors Nos. 11 and 7 for cause. (Aplt. Br. p. 22.) 
Harding claims that because the trial court abused its discretion in Saunders, the trial court 
must have abused its discretion in this case. (Aplt. Br. pp. 22-25.) Even a cursory 
reading of Saunders demonstrates it is factually dissimilar and has no application here. In 
Saunders, the prospective juror at issue stated she was "uncomfortable" deciding an 
attempted rape case because of her personal history with being a victim of incest and 
molestation. Id. at 964. The Utah Supreme Court determined that this juror should have 
been removed for cause because her statement that she would be '"uncomfortable3 in 
deciding [the] case begs further investigation that the trial judge should have allowed." Id. 
at 1150. Her comments and history of recent sexual abuse made clear she could not 
deliberate in a case for attempted rape and sexual abuse of a child without being "affected 
by a consideration extraneous to the facts and law of [the] case." Id. at 964. The 
concerns in Saunders are not present in this case: All potential areas of discomfort 
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expressed by potential jurors Nos. 11 and 7 were followed up on by the trial judge, and 
the judge determined that their deliberations would not be affected by facts extraneous to 
the case. 
Potential Juror No. 12 
Harding takes issue with potential Juror No. 12 because one of her "best friends 
has been a patient of Dr. Bell33 and this friend liked Dr. Bell. (Aplt. Br. p. 8.) Despite 
these allegations, potential Juror No. 12 had no personal relationship with Dr. Bell and 
there is no indication of bias or impartiality on the part of Juror No. 12. Juror No. 12 
was interviewed in chambers, where the following colloquy took place: 
Q: [Mr. Vilos]: Would you be somewhat uneasy in rendering a decision 
against your best friend3s doctor? 
A: [Potential Juror No. 12] No. 
(R. at 1411 pp. 32-33.) Following this in-chambers investigation, the court declined 
Harding's challenge for cause, satisfied that potential Juror No. 12 would listen to the 
evidence and decide the case based upon the evidence presented. (R. at 1411 pp. 35-38.) 
Given potential Juror No. 12's statement that her friend's association with Dr. Bell would 
not cause her to favor Dr. Bell or cause her difficulty in finding liability against Dr. Bell, 
this ruling was within the trial court's broad discretion. 
In sum, based on the totality of the exchanges between the judge, counsel and 
potential jurors, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
Harding's request that potential Jurors Nos. 7, 11 & 12 be removed for cause. To the 
contrary, the Court aggressively questioned each juror in an attempt to illicit any bias, had 
an opportunity to view each juror's demeanor, assess her or his credibility, and satisfied 
itself as to the juror's impartiality. Indeed, in the seven hours spent examining the 
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prospective jurors in this case, the court eliminated many potential jurors for cause, 
demonstrating it had no hesitation to do so if it had any misgivings about a juror's ability 
to sit.3 
B. HARDING FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE ACTUAL PREJUDICE. 
Even if Harding could demonstrate that potential Jurors Nos. 7,11 & 12 were in 
fact biased and that they should have been stricken by the trial court for cause, it would 
nevertheless be error to reverse the jury verdict on this basis because Harding cannot 
demonstrate "actual prejudice" resulted. To obtain a new trial for failure to dismiss a 
prospective juror for cause, cca party must prove that the trial court's failure to dismiss a 
juror for cause resulted in actual prejudice to the party." State v. Russell, 917 E2d 557, 
560 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996); accord State v. Menzies. 
889 P.2d 393, 400 (Utah 1994), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). Mere use of a 
peremptory challenge is alone insufficient. To demonstrate prejudice, Harding must: 
show that as a result of the loss of his peremptory challenge 
[she] was not able to remove another subsequently summoned 
juror who ultimately sat on the jury, and who was "partial or 
incompetent." 
3
 Harding suggests that the trial court should have excused for cause each of these 
potential jurors simply to err on the side of safety, contending cc[t]here were plenty of 
other jurors in the pool to fill out the required eight jurors." (Aplt. Br. p. 22.) 
Notwithstanding the fact that the existence of a large jury pool is not the standard for 
excusing potential jurors for cause, Harding's contention is not supported in the record. 
When Harding's counsel raised this issue during the in-chambers investigation of potential 
jurors, the trial judge stated in response: "Let me backup and say, right now we're just 
about fifty percent. We're striking a lot of people. We do not have a large amount." 
(R. at 1411 p. 37). 
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Wach, 2001 UT 35,1135 (quoting State v. Baker. 935 P.2d 503, 506 (Utah 1997)). This 
determination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Woolley, 810 P. 2d 
440, 442 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
Harding fails to demonstrate that any of the jurors who actually sat were "partial or 
incompetent," as is her burden on appeal. Instead, Harding circumvents the relevant 
inquiry and merely concludes that cc[o]bviously, using all three peremptories to strike 
jurors who should have been stricken for bias was prejudicial to plaintiffs.55 (Aplt. Br. 
p. 25.) This unsupported declaration is not demonstrative of either partiality or 
competence, and falls far short of demonstrating actual prejudice. Indeed, given that the 
jury apportioned a high percentage of fault to Dr. Bell, any argument that the jury was 
biased in his favor is facially untenable. All Harding can show is she used a peremptory 
challenge to remove a panel member whom she claims should have been stricken for cause. 
This does not amount to prejudice sufficient to reverse a jury verdict under Utah law. See 
State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 400 (Utah 1994), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 115 (1995). 
Harding's only contention of prejudice is that "[h]ad the three challenged jurors 
been appropriately stricken for cause, plaintiffs peremptory strikes would have made this 
panel more fair." (Aplt. Br. p. 28.) It is, foremost, rank speculation for Harding to opine 
that she could have empaneled a "more fair" jury if she had the three peremptory 
challenges at issue. More importantly, Utah law only requires an impartial jury, which 
Harding received in this case. Utah law does not require reversal of a jury trial merely 
because Harding now perceives she could have constructed a jury more favorable to her 
position. 
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Significantly, to support her claim of prejudice, Harding ignores current Utah law 
and relies on overturned precedent. Harding represents to this court that "[fjailure to 
excuse a juror for cause in a medical malpractice case, when cause exists, which forces the 
plaintiff to use a peremptory challenge to strike that juror, is reversible error,35 citing 
Tenkins v. Parrish. 627 P.2d 533 (Utah 1981). (Aplt. Br. p. 22.) This portion ofTenkins 
has, however, been expressly overruled by State v. Menzies. See State v. Wach, 2001 UT 
35,1124 n.2 (specifically stating Menzies overturned lenkins). The rule that guides us is, as 
stated above, that "to obtain reversal a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz ,^ show 
that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent." Menzies, 889 P.2d at 400. 
Harding fails to do this. 
POINT II. 
THE JURY VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE AND SHOULD NOT BE REVERSED. 
Harding briefs the denial of her Motions for JNOV and for New Trial as separate 
issues. (Aplt. Br. pp. 29 & 45.) However, because her arguments are essentially the same 
for each issue, they are treated together herein. The gravamen of Harding's contention is 
that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of Harding's comparative 
negligence. 
An insufficiency-of-the-evidence based challenge to a denial of 
either [a JNOV or new trial] motion is governed by one 
standard of review: we reverse only if, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the party who prevailed, we 
conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
verdict. 
Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). Review of the jury's verdict places cca 
difficult burden on the challenging party." Selvage v. T.T. Tohnson & Assoc, 910 P.2d 
15 
1252, 1257 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the 
verdict and, if the evidence supports the verdict, it must be affirmed. Id.; accord Steenblik 
v. Lichfield. 906 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995). 
A. HARDING FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
Because Harding's challenge to the denial of her motions attacks the sufficiency of 
the evidence, it is Harding's burden on appeal "to marshal the evidence in support of the 
verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict." State v Boyd. 2001 UT 30, H2, 25 P.3d 985; Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998). Harding fails to demonstrate that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. For this reason alone, this Court 
can affirm the jury verdict without considering Harding's challenge to the sufficiency of 
the findings. Tanner v. Carter. 2001 UT 18,1f33, 20 P.3d 332; Scharfv. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
This is a medical malpractice action and the defense was substantially mounted 
through expert witnesses. In her brief, Harding fails to cite to the testimony of either of 
defendant's experts. (Aplt. Br. pp. 29-49.) Instead, Harding recites her own trial 
testimony and portions of the trial testimony of Dr. Bell and her subsequent treating 
physician, Dr. Smith, that arguably support her position. (Aplt. Br. pp. 31-33, 39-44.) 
Harding did not even request transcription of the trial testimony of Dr. Ganellen, one of 
Dr. BelPs expert witnesses on the issues of negligence and causation. (R. at 503-504.) 
Nor did she have transcribed the testimony of plaintiffs expert witnesses, Dr. Daniel L. 
Icenogle and Dr. Bertram P. Rosenthal, both of whom testified favorably for the defense 
on cross-examination. (See R. at 499-500, 923.) The testimony of Dr. Ganellen, 
16 
Dr. Icenogle and Dr. Rosenthal is accordingly not even part of the record on appeal. 
Harding cannot be said to have fulfilled her marshaling burden when omitting the trial 
testimony of one of Dr. Bell's chief expert witnesses and the testimony of plaintiffs experts 
favorable to the defense. 
B. THE JURY VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE, 
Even if Harding had satisfied her burden to marshal the evidence, the jury verdict is 
nevertheless beyond reproach because it is supported by substantial evidence. It is well 
established in Utah jurisprudence that "the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the 
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given particular evidence." State v. 
Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). 
The jury found that Harding was more at fault in failing to seek prompt medical 
treatment for her symptoms than was Dr. Bell in failing to diagnose unstable angina. The 
evidence regarding whether Dr. Bell's care met the medical standard of care is accordingly 
as relevant to the "insufficiency of evidence" argument as the evidence of Harding's 
negligence. In her appellate brief, Harding has failed to marshal evidence on both issues. 
There is substantial evidence sufficient both to exonerate Dr. Bell and implicate Harding. 
At trial, Dr. Bell had two expert witnesses testify that Dr. Bell complied in every respect 
with the standard of care: Kim Bateman, M.D., a family practitioner, and Edward 
Ganellen, M.D., a board-certified cardiologist. (R. at 1416 pp. 11-12, 20-21, 23-25.)4 
4
 As stated above, Dr. Ganellen's trial testimony is not part of the record and 
accordingly cannot be cited to. Citation can only be made to Dr. Bateman's testimony 
and Harding's medical records. Some of Dr. Ganellen's testimony was summarized by 
defense counsel in closing argument. (R. at 1412 pp. 8-9.) 
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There is also ample evidence of Harding's comparative fault. The evidence is that 
on January 24 and 25, 1997, two days before Harding suffered a heart attack which she 
claims Dr. Bell should have prevented, Harding had recurrent chest pain, accompanied 
with incidents of malaise, tiredness and exertional discomfort. (R. at 1415 pp. 67-68; R. 
at 1422 Def.'s Ex. A. p. 114). Harding did not go to an emergency room or seek medical 
care on either of those two days. (R. at 1416 pp. 26-27). She did not seek medical 
treatment during two days of chest pain and other ominous symptoms, despite the facts 
that: she had a family history of heart disease, with her father having had bypass heart 
surgery four times and who died of a heart disease at age 48; she had a 30-plus year 
history of smoking; she had a history of high blood pressure; she was being treated by Dr. 
Bell to determine the cause of her January 4, 1997, chest and arm pain; and, she had been 
referred to and had an appointment with a cardiologist, Dr. Asay, to rule out coronary 
artery disease. (R. at 1414 pp. 66-67, 75-78, 121; R. at 1415 pp. 67-68; R. at 1422 
Def.'s Ex. A. pp. 17, 114.) Dr. Bateman and Dr. Ganellen testified at trial that had 
Harding sought medical attention on January 24th or 25th, Harding would have been 
admitted to the hospital and treated, preventing her January 26th heart attack. (R. at 1416 
pp. 26-27, 64.) 
This evidence is more than sufficient to support the jury verdict allocating 45 
percent of fault to Dr. Bell and 55 percent of fault to Harding. This verdict is well within 
the range of possible findings based upon the evidence presented, especially when viewed 
in the light most favorable to Dr. Bell. This court must accordingly defer to the jury's 
assessment of liability. 
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C. FACTS REGARDING HARDING'S CONDUCT PRIOR TO 
JANUARY 13, 1997, PROVIDES NO BASIS TO OVERTURN THE 
JURY VERDICT FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. 
Rather than satisfy her burden to marshal the evidence, Harding makes the 
convoluted argument that the jury verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence because 
the jury should not have been allowed "to consider any factor for either negligence or 
causation which preexisted the January 13, 1997, visit to Dr. Bell," Le^ , Harding's history 
of smoking and her failure to go to a doctor right away on January 4, 1997, after the 
truck stop incident. (Aplt. Br. p. 35.) According to Harding, her conduct prior to 
January 13, 1997, could not be a contributing factor in causing her injury and thus this 
evidence should not have been admitted and considered by the jury and, without this 
evidence, the jury could not have found any comparative negligence by Harding. (Aplt. 
Br. pp. 33-38.)5 
Substantively, this is a challenge to the jury verdict based on the admission of 
evidence for consideration by the jury, not for insufficiency of the evidence. The record 
demonstrates Harding did not object to, and the trial court did not rule upon, the 
admissibility of evidence of facts existing prior to January 13, 1997. Indeed, it was 
Harding that introduced evidence of Harding's smoking, (R. at 1414 pp. 66-67), and her 
failure to see a doctor promptly after the January 4th truck stop episode. (R. at 1414 pp. 
5
 Harding's contention that the jury would have returned a verdict in her favor had 
the jury not been allowed to consider evidence of Harding's conduct prior to January 13, 
1997, is pure speculation. It is not known how the jury calculated its apportionment of 
liability or what evidentiary components it considered in making this determination. 
Based solely on the evidence of Harding's conduct after January 13, 1997, the jury could 
easily have found Harding 55 percent negligent, given Harding's failure to seek medical 
attention after suffering two days of chest pain on January 24 and 25, 1997. See 
Discussion at Point II. C. 
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75, 77) Harding has not properly preserved this issue for appellate review and has 
waived this contention absent plain error,6 which Harding has neither argued nor 
demonstrated. State v. Schreuden 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986); Utah R. Evid. 
103(a). For this reason alone, this court should decline to address Harding's contention 
regarding the admission of evidence of facts existing prior to January 13, 1997. 
Even if it were proper to entertain Harding's claim in this regard, it would 
nevertheless be unavailing. Evidence of Harding's smoking and other risk factors pre-
dating January 13, 1997, was not introduced for the purpose of establishing comparative 
fault: This evidence was presented for the purpose of establishing damages and relevant 
medical issues. Harding claims that Dr. Bell failed to diagnose her CAD, causing her to 
suffer a preventable heart attack on January 26, 1997, which Harding claimed puts her at 
risk for a future heart attack and a shortened life span. (R. at 6 & 960.) Dr. Smith, 
Dr. Ganellen and Dr. Rosenthal each testified at trial that it is Harding's CAD which puts 
her at increased risk for future heart attacks and a shortened life span, not her January 26th 
heart attack. (R. at 923; R. at 1415 pp. 43, 60-61; See R. at 1412 p. 17.) Dr. Smith 
testified that "the fact she smoked significantly increased her likelihood of developing 
coronary artery disease." (R. 1415 p. 43.) Dr. Ganellen further testified that Harding 
6
 Harding's representation that cc[p]laintiff made early objections to the 
consideration of Geri Harding's pre-existing conditions," (Aplt. Br. p. 36), is simply not 
true. The only portion of the record to which Harding cites in support of this assertion is 
her trial brief and the trial court's memorandum of the daily proceedings. (See Aplt. Br. 
pp. 10 & 26; R. at 952-53 & 1048.) This is insufficient. Rule 7 requires Harding to 
make application to the Court for exclusion of evidence, stating "with particularity the 
grounds therefor." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1). A careful review of the record demonstrates 
Harding failed to do this. She made no objection to the trial court at the time the evidence 
was presented and, accordingly, deprived the trial court of an opportunity to rule on any 
such objection. 
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suffered the January 26th heart attack because of CAD attributable to her 30-plus year 
smoking habit, not because she did not see a cardiologist sooner. (See R. at 924; R. at 
1412 p. 17.) 
Evidence that Harding waited nine days after she experienced chest and arm pain at 
the truck stop on January 4, 1997, before seeking medical treatment on January 13, 1997, 
was not admitted as evidence of Harding's comparative fault. Rather, it was admitted as 
relevant to medical issues relating to her diagnosis of CAD. Dr. Bateman and 
Dr. Ganellen testified that the fact Harding had no recurrence of symptoms during the 
nine days after the truck stop incident, removed her from the diagnosis of ccunstable 
angina," making the diagnosis of CAD more difficult. (R. At 1416 pp. 18, 20, 21, 26, 
29, 57-61; see R. at 1412 p. 8). 
CONCLUSION 
There is no basis to overturn the jury verdict in this case and it must be affirmed. 
The evidence in the record is that Harding received a fair trial from a non-biased and 
impartial jury, and the jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence. Harding's claims 
to the contrary are neither supported in fact or law and must be disregarded for what they 
are: an attempt to conjure up error where there is none. 
DATED this *3{ day of October, 2001. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
( • M 
By \J AA^w \ / 
Gary^B. Ferguson ~ I 
Dennis C. Ferguson \ 
Attorneys for Defendant Dr. Bell 
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135 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 47 
verdict form. Martineau v. Anderson, 636 P.2d accuracy; if counsel was prevented from mak-
1039 (Utah 1981). ing objections to instructions, he should, under 
this rule, be deemed to have done so. Hanks v. 
In general. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 (1960). 
To preserve a question for appeal, an objec-
tion must be clear and concise and made in a Harmless error 
fashion calculated to obtain a ruling thereon.
 I f , instructions" are correct anv error Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. App. /? , t h e m s t ™ c t l 0 n s * * « ™ . any error 
-mom 4. J • J onnnoj HAC/TU u innm which prevents counsel from making objections 1989), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). ,, . r . , , * J, thereto is harmless error. Hanks v. 
Instructions. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8,354 P2d 564 (1960). 
—Right to object. Cited in Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455 
The parties have a right to make objections to (Utah 1981); Broberg v. Hess, 782 R2d 198 
the instructions to preserve challenges to their (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate A.L.R. — Sufficiency in federal court of mo-
Review § 614. tion in limine to preserve for appeal objection to 
C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 202 et evidence absent contemporary objection at 
seq. trial, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 619. 
Rule 47. Jurors. 
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties or their 
attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself 
conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties 
or their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is 
material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such 
additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper. 
(b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that one or two jurors in addition 
to the regular panel be called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors. 
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, 
prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or 
disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the 
same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same 
examination and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the same 
functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the principal jurors. An alternate 
juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged after the jury 
retires to consider its verdict. If one or two alternate jurors are called each 
party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise 
allowed. The additional peremptory challenge may be used only against an 
alternate juror, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by law shall not 
be used against the alternates. 
(c) Challenge defined; by whom made. A challenge is an objection made to 
the trial jurors and may be directed (1) to the panel or (2) to an individual juror. 
Either party may challenge the jurors, but where there are several parties on 
either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made. 
(d) Challenge to panel; time and manner of taking; proceedings. A challenge 
to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the forms 
prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the 
intentional omission of the proper officer to summon one or more of the jurors 
drawn. It must be taken before a juror is sworn. It must be in writing or be 
stated on the record, and must specifically set forth the facts constituting the 
ground of challenge. If the challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the 
jury so far as the trial in question is concerned. 
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory challenges. The 
challenges to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause. Each party 
shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as provided under 
Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule. 
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(f) Challenges for cause; how tried. Challenges for cause may be taken on 
ne or more of the following grounds: 
(1) A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a person 
ampetent as a juror. 
(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either party, or to 
n officer of a corporation that is a party 
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guardian and ward, 
laster and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent, to either 
arty, or united in business with either party, or being on any bond or 
bligation for either party; provided, that the relationship of debtor and 
reditor shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a resident 
hereof indebted to such municipality by reason of a tax, license fee, or service 
harge for water, power, light or other services rendered to such resident. 
(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on a previous trial 
between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then a witness 
herein. 
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the result of the action, or 
a the main question involved in the action, except his interest as a member or 
itizen of a municipal corporation. 
(6) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to the 
:ause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and 
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no 
>erson shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed 
m opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded upon 
mblic rumor, statements in public journals or common notoriety, if it satisfac-
torily appears to the court that the juror can and will, notwithstanding such 
>pinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
Any challenge for cause shall be tried by the court. The juror challenged, and 
my other person, may be examined as a witness on the trial of such challenge. 
(g) Selection of jury. The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of jurors 
Aiat are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for all 
3eremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sustained, 
mother juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are 
nade, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the 
challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors 
remaining, in the order called, and each side, beginning with the plaintiff, shall 
indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn 
until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then 
call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to 
constitute the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, and the 
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. 
(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath must be 
administered to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well 
and truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and a true verdict 
rendered according to the evidence and the instructions of the court. 
(i) Proceedings when juror discharged. If, after the jury is impaneled and 
before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqualified to perform his duty and 
there is no alternate juror, the parties may agree to proceed with the other 
jurors, or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew. If the parties do 
not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and the case shall be tried with 
a new jury. 
(j) View by jury. When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to 
have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place in 
which any material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body 
under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by 
some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jury are thus 
absent no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them on 
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(k) Separation of jury. If the jurors are permitted to separate, either during 
the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished by the 
court that it is their duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to be 
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their 
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
(1) Deliberation of jury. When the case is finally submitted to the jury they 
may decide in court or retire for deliberation. If they retire they must be kept 
together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree 
upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Unless 
by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge must not suffer 
any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask 
them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he must not, before the 
verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations 
or the verdict agreed upon. 
(m) Papers taken by jury. Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may take 
with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and all papers which 
have been received as evidence in the cause, except depositions or copies of 
such papers as ought not, in the opinion of the court, to be taken from the 
person having them in possession; and they may also take with them notes of 
the testimony or other proceedings on the trial taken by themselves or any of 
them, but none taken by any other person. 
(n) Additional instructions of jury. After the jury have retired for delibera-
tion, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part of the testimony, or 
if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they may 
require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being brought into 
court the information required must be given in the presence of, or after notice 
to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given in writing or stated 
on the record. 
(o) New trial when no verdict given. If a jury is discharged or prevented from 
giving a verdict for any reason, the action shall be tried anew. 
(p) Court deemed in session pending verdict; verdict may be sealed. While 
the jury is absent the court may be adjourned from time to time in respect to 
other business, but it shall be open for every purpose connected with the cause 
submitted to the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury discharged. The 
court may direct the jury to bring in a sealed verdict at the opening of the court, 
in case of an agreement during a recess or adjournment for the day. 
(q) Declaration of verdict. When the jury or three-fourths of them, or such 
other number as may have been agreed upon by the parties pursuant to Rule 
48, have agreed upon a verdict they must be conducted into court, their names 
called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreman; the verdict must 
be in writing, signed by the foreman, and must be read by the clerk to the jury, 
and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict. Either party may require the 
jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court or clerk asking each juror if 
it is his verdict. If, upon such inquiry or polling there is an insufficient number 
of jurors agreeing therewith, the jury must be sent out again; otherwise the 
verdict is complete and the jury shall be discharged from the cause. 
(r) Correction of verdict. If the verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, it 
may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be 
sent out again. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1998.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment, effective January 1, 1998, substituted 
"stated on the record" for "noted by the report-
er" in the second sentence of Subdivision (d) 
and for "taken down by the reporter" at the end 
of Subdivision (n) and made stylistic changes. 
rule is similar to Rule 47(a), F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Jurors generally, 
§ 78-46-1 et seq. 
Three-fourths of jurors may find verdict in 
civil case, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 10. 
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